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DROIT AU TRAVAIL 
Compulsory Arbitration 
in Bristish Columbia: Bill 33 
Peter Z. W. Tsong 
The author présents the reasons for the introduction 
of Bill 33 in British Columbia, examines the disputes which 
were settled under it, évaluâtes its impact on the frequency 
and the duration of work stoppages, and its rôle in the 
future of labour management relations in this province. 
One of the most controversial pièces of labour législation in the 
history of the Canadian labour movement has now been in effect for over 
two years. It is time for an objective assessment of the reasons for the 
introduction of such législation, the disputes which were settled under it, 
its impact on the frequency and the duration of work stoppages, and its 
rôle in the future of labour management relations in the province of 
British Columbia. 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
Bill 33, or The Médiation Commission Act, widely hailed as the 
first compulsory arbitration législation in peace-time North America 
covering the private sector, was passed on December 2, 1968 ; it is pro 
bably one of the most sophisticated labour laws ever adopted to institu 
tionalize conflits regarding interest 
disputes and to provide govern-
ment assistance and/or compulsion 
in the resolution of conflictsl. It 
TSONG, P.Z.W., Assistant-Professor, 
Faculty of Commerce and Business 
Administration, The University of 
British Columbia, VANCOUVER. 
* The author would like to thank Larry F. MOORE and Vance F. MITCHELL for 
their helpful comments on the paper. 
** For other comments on B.C. Bill 33, of HALL, N.A., « Contemporary Public 
Policy Issues in Industrial Relations» Relations industrielles, vol. 24, no 1, 1969, 
pp. 19-31. 
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provides a médiation commission to conduct inquiries and heariings on 
labour disputes 2. The Commission acts and conducts its hearings in a man-
ner not unlike a court proceeding but it has greater flexibility than a labour 
court in taking évidence and compelling the attendance of witnesses, nor is 
it bound by the technical rules of légal évidence. The controversdal part of 
the Bill is that which provides that the décision of the Commission after 
a hearing can be made binding upon the parties for two years by the order 
of the Provincial Cabinet if this is deemed necessary in the interest and 
welfare of the public. The hearing may be requested by either or both 
parties involved in the dispute or directed by the Minister of Labour at 
his own discrétion. The décision to be rendered can be made binding prior 
to the hearing if both parties agrée in advance. 
LABOUR AND EMPLOYER ATTITUDES 
Labour fought long and hard against Bill 33. Almost every major 
labour leader in British Columbia spoke out against it. The Président and 
the Secretary-Treasurer of the B. C. Fédération of Labour, the Régional 
Président of the IWA, the Président of the CUPE, the Président of the 
ILWU joined in unison in their opposition to the Bill. They organized 
protest démonstrations, created a « Beat Bill 33 » fund, and engaged in 
an active campaign against the Bill. There were a few labour leaders who 
supported the Bill, but their voice was the voice of the minority. This 
was not the first time that labour had fought against new labour légis-
lation. The labour movement had fought the introduction of the Labour 
Relations Act, which is very similar to the Fédéral Labour Relations and 
Disputes Investigation Act3. It also fought the revision of the Trade Unions 
Act in 19594. Like ail previous labour législation introduced by the 
présent government, Bill 33 was a partisan bill. The Bill was by a vote 
of 22-28, with ail the NDPs and Libérais of the opposition against the 
party in power, the Social Crédit MLAs5. Employers were overwhel-
mingly in favour of the Bill. Not a single employées voice was raised 
against it. Newspapers generally supported the Bill, and urged the labour 
movement to give the Bill a chance. 
i Harry W. ARTHURS, Labor Disputes in Essential Industries, Task Force on 
Labour Relations, Study No. 8, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970, 
p. 52. 
2 The Médiation Commission consists of a Chairman, a member from the rank 
of management and a member from the rank of labour. The current Commission 
was appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council with a seven-year tenure, 
beginning June 1, 1968. 
3 Paul PHILLIPS, « No Greater Power - A Century of Labour in B.C. » B.C. 
Fédération of Labour, 1967, p. 146. 
4 Id., p. 156. 
5 NDP stands for National Démocratie Party, and MLA stands for Member of 
the Législative Assembly of the province. 
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WAS THE BILL NECESSARY ? 
Was it true that this was the first compulsory arbitration act ever 
passed in North America covering the private sector in peace-time ? Were 
labour disputes in British Columbia much worse than in other provinces ? 
Was Bill 33 an employers' bill ? Thèse are pertinent questions. 
It was quite obvious at the beginning of this study that it would not 
be possible to obtain unreserved coopération from any of the parties who 
had an interest in making the législation work, or in its démolition. In 
British Columbia, probably more than in some of the other provinces, 
every word uttered in public concerning labour-management relations is 
carefully weighted and calculated to achieve the maximum political effect. 
Therefore, in order to accommodate the political nature inhérent in the 
problem under investigation, personal interviews were ruled out as a 
means of acquiring information. What follows is, hopefully, an objective 
account of why the Bill was introduced. 
It appears that from a careful investigation of the labour législation 
of other provinces in Canada that the sensational claim that Bill 33 was 
the first compulsory arbitration bill ever introduced in North America 
covering the private sector in peace-time is not completely justified. The 
prairie province of Manitoba, for example, has permitted its provincial 
government, since 1954, to impose a ban on any work stoppages which 
threaten to interfère with 
« . . . opération of (a) business or functions... essential to health and 
well-being of the people of the province or some of them ». 6 
Broadly interpreted, almost any business or function covered by 
the section might be considered as « essential. . . to the well-being of the 
people » 7. This implies that a ban on strike action can be applied to the 
private sector as well as to the public sector. The Cabinet has the power 
to confirm or vary, and make binding, the award of a mediator in ail 
disputes affecting industry8. According to this interprétation, Bill 33 was 
certainly not the first labour législation in Canada to provide binding 
arbitration that covers the private sector as well as the public sector. 
However, the Manitoba Labour Relations Act has only been applied to 
employées traditionally prohibited from striking, such as police, public 
utihty employées, public employées and teachers, with the exception of 
Liquor Control Commission employées. This means that the interprétation 
of the Manitoba Labour Relations Act was much narrower in scope, 
and was applied only to workers engaged in the so-called « essential ser-
6 Labour Relations Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. 110, s. 78, as amended, S.M. 1958. 
c. 29. 
7
 Harry W. ARTHURS, op. cit., supra, note 1, p. 54. 
8 là., p. 72. 
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vices ». If Bill 33 were actually applied to disputes in the private sector, 
which it was, it would not make Bill 33 the first compulsory arbitration 
législation in North America covering the private sector in peace-time, but 
it would mark the province as the first in Canada, though not in North 
America, to apply compulsory arbitration by the order of the Cabinet to 
the private sector in peace-time 9. 
Was the Bill necessary at the time when it was introduced ? Was 
it an employers' bill ? Labor experts in British Columbia believe that 
the Bill was badly needed. Hall believed that the collective bargaining 
process in the province was in a shocking state of disrepair 10. Jamieson 
pointed out that, in 1966, the incidence of strikes in Canada exceeded that 
of the United States as measured by ail major indices ; i.e., percentage 
TABLE I 
Working days lost per striker 
International Cornparison 
Canada U.S. Australia U.K. 
1960 15.0 14.5 1.2 3.7 
1961 13.6 11.2 2.0 3.9 
1962 19.1 15.1 1.4 1.3 
1963 11.0 17.1 1.4 3.0 
1964 15.7 14.0 1.7 7.6 
1965 13.7 15.0 1.7 3.3 
1966 12.3 13.0 1.9 4.4 
1967 15.8 14.7 1.5 3.8 
1968 22.7 18.5 n.a. 2.1 
1969 25.3 17.3 n.a. 4.1 
Notes : (1) Canadian data covers disputes lasting 10 days or more. 
(2) U.S. data excludes disputes involving less than 6 workers or those lasting 
less than a full day or shift. 
(3) Sources of data : (a) Report of Woods Task Force on Industrial Rela-
tions, Privy Council, Queens Printer, Table 17, 
p. 126. 
(b) Circulation, Employers' Council of B.C. August, 
1970. 
9 Herbert R. NORTHRUP, « Expérience with Compulsory Arbitration », (éd.) 
Readings in Labour Economies and Labour Relations, Richard L. ROWAN and Her-
bert R. NORTHRUP, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968, p. 391. 
io Noël A. HALL, « Contemporary Public Policy Issues in Industrial Relations » 
in Relations Industrielles / Industrial Relations, Québec, Laval Univ., vol. 24, no. 1, 
January, 1969, p. 19. 
France 
1.0 
1.0 
1.3 
2.3 
1.0 
0.8 
0.8 
1.5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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of days' employment lost, percentage of union members involved, and 
relative frequency, as weÛ as average duration n . In 1968, Canada led 
most of the western countries in the number of man-days lost per 1,000 
persons employed 12. 
TABLE / / 
International Strike Records 
Average for 10 years 
(1959-1968) 1968 
Man-days/1,000 Man-days/1,000 
employées Rank employées Rank 
U.S.A. 1,114 1 1,590 2 
Italy 1,088 2 930 4 
Ireland 828 3 920 5 
Canada 784 4 1,670 1 
India 697 5 1,080 3 
Denmark 404 6 20 12 
Australia 345 7 450 6 
Finland 314 8 250 9 
France 312 9 n.a. n.a. 
Japan 282 10 160 11 
Source : The U.K. Department of Employment and Productivity, « Employment 
and Productivity Gazette », November, 1969, p. 1024. 
Most employers were delighted at the introduction of the Bill. The 
British Columbia Chamber of Commerce, the Pulp and Paper Industrial 
Relations Bureau, the British Columbia section of the Canadian Manu-
facturing Association, and The Amalgamated Construction Association ail 
came out in support of the Bill. The Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of MacMillan Bloedel Ltd., J. V. Clyne, was alleged by the NDP to be 
the author of the Bill13. It was not clear whether the employers had 
participated in the draft of the Bill, but it was quite clear that labour was 
not consulted. The Provincial Government's Labour Management Commi-
tee was not informed of the Bill before it was introduced 14. From this 
H Stuart JAMIESON, « The Third Wave Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in 
Canada ; 1900-1967 », in Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, Québec, Laval 
University, vol 25, no. 1, January 1970, p. 24. 
12 UK Department of Employment and Productivity, November, 1969, Em-
ployment and Productivity Gazette, p. 1024. Also Circulation, Employers, Council 
of B.C., August 1970. 
13 Vancouver Sun, Mardi 28, 1968, p. 1-2. 
14 Vancouver Sun, March 19, 1968, p. 41. 
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évidence, one may call the Bill « the employers' Bill », one may also say 
that the Bill was timely and necessary : a review of some of the historical 
characteristics or union organization and industrial disputes would further 
support the second half of this statement. 
In relation to the rest of Canada, and perhaps to North America as 
well, British Columbia is a highly unionized province. In 1959, 53.9% 
of the paid workers in the province were organized. Even in 1969, when 
the percentage of paid workers who were organized had declined to 
40.9%, as show in Table III, British Columbia still had the highest per-
centage of organized labour in Canada 15. If one accepts the postulate 
that a décline in the percentage of paid workers organized is an indication 
of a relative décline in power of the trade unions in the province, the 
timing of the Bill seems puzzling. If labour influence had declined, it was 
hardly necessary to introduce strong anti-labour législation at such a 
rime. However, if one postulâtes that the impact of the trade unions can 
be measured by the absolute size of the union membership, then the 
influence of the trade unions in British Columbia actually had increased 
steadily over rime. If the latter postulate is accepted, one can conclude 
that the introduction of the Bill was designed to curb the power of the 
unions. However, this explanation lacks objectivity. There must be a more 
satisfactory explanation of the timing of the Bill. 
TABLE III 
Degree of union organization in British Columbia 
Séries I 
Number of union members Percentage of non-agricultural 
in B.C. labour force organized 
1911 22,597 12.4 
1915 10,757 5.9 
1919 40,070 21.8 
1920 19,000 10.1 
1925 28,175 13.1 
1934 19,017 7.2 
1940 47,598 17.5 
1946 99,466 28.9 
1955 166,550 * 35.3 
Source : Labour Organization in Canada 1911-1955, Census of Canada 1911-1961. 
15 B.C. Department of Labour, Labour Organization in Canada 1911-55, Census 
of Canada 1911-61 ; Annual Report, Pueen's Printer, Victoria, 1966, p. 100, and 
Canada Department of Labour, Industrial and Géographie Distribution of Union 
Membership in Canada in 1967-69, Economie Research Branch. 
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Séries II 
Number of union members Percentage of total paid 
in B.C. workers organized 
1955 186,951 * 47.9 
1958 233,972 53.9 
1960 215,437 48.1 
1966 256,241 42.7 
1969 261,134 40.9 
Source : British Columbia, Department of Labour, Annual Report, Queen's Printer, 
Victoria, 1966, p. 100, and Economie Research Branch, Canada Department 
of Labour, Industrial and Géographie Distribution of Union Membership 
in Canada in 1967-1969. 
* The différence is attributable to the independent reporting practice of thèse 
two government agencis. 
WORK STOPPAGES IN B.C. : COMPARATIVE FIGURES 
Could it be that labour in British Columbia was more strike-prone 
than their fellow workers in the rest of Canada ? If there were more work 
stoppages in British Columbia than in other provinces before Bill 33 was 
introduced, then the frequency of strikes and lockouts would hâve provided 
the necessary catalyst for the introduction of a strong anti-labour bill. 
In 1967, British Columbia had 9.91% of the labour force in Canada, 
or 762,000 workers as shown in Table IV. If strikes and lockouts are 
proportional to the size of the labour force, then, on the average, British 
Columbia should hâve approximately 9.91% of the total number of la-
bour disputes in Canada. However, despite the high rate of unionization, 
British Columbia had less than its share of labour disputes from 1960-
1969, with the exception of 1962 and 1969. Figures in Table V show 
that in 1967 British Columbia had only 8.24% of the total number of 
work stoppages in the nation 16. Therefore, the hypothesis or postulate 
that British Columbia had more than its share of strikes and lockouts as 
a reason for the introduction of the Bill must be rejected. However, Table 
IV also shows that the gênerai trend of its share of labour disputes was 
on the rise from 1960-1969, with the exception of 1962-1963 and 1964-
1966. This might be an important clue. If the frequency of labour disputes 
increased, conceivably this could hâve led to greater public support for a 
strong anti-labour bill. But since British Columbia had less than its share 
of labour disputes in most periods before 1968, the fact that its share of 
labour disputes was on the rise does not appear to be a strong reason for 
the introduction of the Bill. 
16
 More statistics are available in the following sources : Labour Gazette, 1901-
1951, Strikes and Lockouts in Canasta, 1952-1965 ; Annual Report, B. C. Department 
of Labour, 1920-1969, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1966-1968, Economies and 
Researche Branch, Canada Department of Labour, 1966-68, Labour Gazette, Decem-
ber 1970, p. 900. 
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1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
B.C. 
564,000 
576,000 
590,000 
610,000 
639,000 
667,000 
710,000 
762,000 
816,000 
826,0001 
TABLE IV 
Comparison of Work Stoppages A 
British Columbia and Canada 
Number of workers 
involved in workBCLP % 
stoppages CLF % 
Canada B.C. Canada 
B.C. workers 
involved in work 
stoppages % 
6,411,000 
6,521,000 
6,615.000 
6,748,000 
6,933,000 
7,141,000 
7,420,000 
7,694,000 
7,919,000 
999 
1,638 
1,982 
824 
9,503 
6,755 
21,183 
12,030 
16,523 
8,162,0002 18,117 
49,408 
97,959 
74,332 
83,428 
100,535 
171,870 
411,459 
262,027 
223,562 
306,799 
2.02 
1.68 
2.67 
0.98 
0.95 
3.94 
5.14 
4.78 
7.38 
5.89 
Canada workers 
involved in work 
stoppages % 
8.78 
8.85 
8.80 
9.05 
9.21 
9.35 
9.57 
9.91 
10.30 
10.10 
Source : Canada Year Book, 1968, p. 760, p. 763. 
1
 B.C. Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1969, p. 
2
 D.B.S. Annual Supplément to the Canadian Statistical 
BCLF : B. C. Labour Force 
CLF : Canadian Labour Force 
J 20 
Review, 1969. 
The foregoing analysis overlooks one factor ; the number of work 
stoppages or the share of work stoppages is not the only measure of 
labour unrest. If the bargaining unit involved in the disputes were large, 
then even though the number of disputes were below the Canadian 
average, the number of workers involved may be relatively large. This 
leads one to hypothesize that the more workers are involved in labour 
disputes, the more likely it is that stronger anti-labour législation will be 
introduced. If British Columbia had more than its share of workers 
involved in work stoppages before the introduction of the Bill, one would 
suspect it might hâve contributed to the public sentiment in favour of 
the Bill. However, the record shows again that this could not be the reason 
for the introduction of Bill 33. In 1966, only 5.14% of the total number 
of workers involved in the work stoppages resided in British Columbia, 
and, in 1967, only 4.78% of them resided in British Columbia, as shown 
in Table IV. For 1960-1969, British Columbia is shown to hâve had less 
than its share of workers involved in work stoppages than many of the 
other provinces. However, the trend of the percentage of workers stop-
pages in British Columbia was generally on the increase which may hâve 
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1960 12 274 
1961 17 287 
1962 29 311 
1963 18 332 
1964 27 343 
1965 39 501 
1966 39 617 
1967 43 522 
1968 57 582 
1969 85 595 
TABLE V 
Comparison of Work Stoppages B 
British Columbia and Canada 
B. C. Canada 
Number of Work Number of Work No. of Disputes No. of Disputes 
Stoppages Stoppages in B. C. in Canada % 
4.38 
5.92 
9.35 
5.43 
7.86 
7.79 
6.32 
8.24 
9.80 
14.30 
Source : Labour Gazette, 1901-1951, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1952-1965. 
B. C. Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1920-1966. Economies & Re-
search Branch, Canada Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockouts in Ca-
nada, 1966-1968. Labour Gazette, December 1970, p. 900. Department of 
Labour B. C , Annual Report, Queen's Printer, 1969, p. 558. 
contributed to public sentiment in favour of the Bill for reasons similar 
to the ones already given. 
So far, no truly compelling reason has been found for the introduc-
tion of the Bill. But it is unlikely that it was simply the whim of the 
politicians who wished to curb the power of the labour movement and 
to strengthen the alliance between the employers and the government. 
In a démocratie society, politicians promote a bill only when they perceive 
the likelihood of public support. The crucial question is what factor led 
the politicians of British Columbia to believe that the public was ready 
for such a bill. The hypothesis that the lenght of strikes may be the deter-
mining factor is worthy of exploration. There is plenty of évidence show-
ing that strikes and lockouts were unusually long and acrimonious in 
British Columbia in the last ten years, especially in 1967 and 1968, when 
the Bill was conceived and introduced. Statistics in Table VI show that 
during 70% of the years 1960-1969, man-days lost per striker were 
higher in British Columbia than the Canadian average 17. In 1967, man-
days lost per striker were 29.7 in British Columbia, versus 15.8 for Ca-
nada as a whole. In 1968, it was 29.4 man-days for British Columbia, 
and 22.7 days for Canada. 
n lbid. 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA : BILL 33 753 
TABLE VI 
Comparison of Work Stoppages C 
British Columbia and Canada 
B.C. 
Employées 
involved 
B.C. 
Man-days lost 
B.C. 
Man-days 
lost/striker 
Canada 
Man-days lost/ 
striker 
1960 999 35,800 35.8 15.0 
1961 1,638 34,700 21.2 13.6 
1962 1,982 33,000 16.0 19.1 
1963 824 24,100 29.2 11.0 
1964 9,503 181,800 19.1 15.7 
1965 6,755 104,400 15.4 13.7 
1966 21,183 240,230 11.5 12.3 
1967 12,030 350,730 29.7 15.8 
1968 16,523 486,400 29.4 22.7 
1969 17,916 406,645 22.7 25.3 
Source : Labour Gazette, 1901-1951, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1952-1965. 
B. C. Department of Labour, Annual Report, \920-\966.Strikes and Lock-
outs in Canada, 1966-1968, Canada Department of Labour, Economies & 
Research Branch, Labour Gazette, December 1970, p. 900. Department of 
Labour, Annual Report, B. C , Queen's Printer, 1969, p. 558. 
It is a well-known fact that long and bitter work stoppages tend 
to attract more attention than short ones. Therefore, in spite of the better-
than-average record of work stoppages in British Columbia, its long-
drawn-out work stoppages may hâve made the people less tolérant of 
such inconvenience and nuisance. This was the most compelling reason 
that the author was able to find for the introduction of Bill 33 at that 
time in the province. 
The political climate of the province was an influential factor also. 
The Social Crédit party was traditionally identified with political conser-
vatism and financial orthodoxy. Its philosophy underlay the study of 
Swedish labour laws and practices by Nemetz, which were often cited as 
the reason for the introduction of Bill 33 18. It has been suggested that 
important labour législation is often introduced after a sudden burst of 
work stoppages. There were over a million man-days lost in 1946, 1952 
!8 Nathaniel Théodore NEMETZ, Report of Swedish Labour Laws and Practices, 
Queen's Printer, B. C. 1968. 
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and 1959. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act was introduced 
in 1947. The Labour Relations Act was introduced in 1954, and the 
Trade Unions Act was revised in 1959. Since the total man-days lost in 
1966 and 1967 was not exceptionally large, the previous explanation of 
the influence of long work stoppages is still the best reason one can find 
for the introduction of the Bill. 
THE EFFECT OF BILL 33 ON LABOUR-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 
What has the Bill had accomplished in the span of slightly over two 
years studied hère? Perhaps it would be more reasonable to ask what 
the Médiation Commission has accomplished in the last two years ? Has 
it resolved many difficult disputes ? Has it gained the confidence of labour 
and management? Has it provided the urgently needed research in the 
field of collective bargaining ? Has it changed the attitudes of labour and 
management with respect to each other and toward the government ? 
It is not easy to formulate a complète and définitive answer to any one 
of thèse questions. 
From the degree of opposition by the labour movement, and the 
cautious approach by the government with regard to compulsory sections 
of the Act, one would expect the Act or the Commission to be used 
rather sparingly with the exception of the médiation service, which is a 
continuation of the médiation service provided by the provincial Depart-
ment of Labour before the Act was passed. Altogether, in slightly over 
two years, only eleven décisions were rendered by the Commission after 
a formai hearing, as summarized in Table VII. Among the eleven déci-
sions, two were reconsiderations of décisions made earlier. In other words, 
only nine disputes in the past two years engaged the complète service of 
the Commission. 
Among the nine disputes, only five were disputes in the private 
sector. Let us see what was the degree of compulsion involved in the four 
disputes in the private sector. Among thèse four décisions, one was not 
binding, in one it was agreed by both parties prior to the décision that 
they would be bound by it, and two were ordered binding on the parties 
by the Minister of Labour, involving the compulsory section of the Act. 
In short, Section 18 was invoked only two times without any equivoca-
tion 19. It was also invoked against the construction labour dispute in the 
summer of 1970, but the order was later suspended and by-passed by a 
facesaving scheme. Therefore, it could not be regarded as a full test of 
the Bill. The five décisions rendered on the disputes in the public sector 
were accepted by the parties to the disputes. 
!9 Section 18 of the Bill permits the Cabinet to order the décision of the Com-
mission binding on the parties. 
TABLE VII 
Summary of Hearings of the Médiation Commission as of April 15, 1971 
Datel Employer Union Sector Type of Hearing Décision Major Issues Acceptance 
Nov. 14, 1968 Civil Service Commis-
sion 
Psychiatrie Nurses 
Association 
Public Directed 2 Non-binding Parity with R.N. Yes 
June 18, 1969 The Board of Police 
Commissioners, The 
City of Vancouver 
Vancouver Police-
men's Union 
Public Voluntary 3 Binding Wage increases Yes 
June 18, 1969 City of Vancouver Vancouver Fire-
fighters' Union 
Public Voluntary Non-binding Parity with 
Vancouver Police 
Acceptance under 
> protest 
Aug. 22, 1969 The Board of Police Victoria City Police- Public Voluntary Non-binding Parity with Asked for recon-
Commissioners, the men's Union Vancouver Police sideration 
City of Victoria 
Oct. 3, 1969 Six oil companies OCAW Private Directed Non-binding Wage increases No (strike con-
tinues) 
Oct. 7, 1969 The Board of Police Victoria City Police- Public Directed Non-binding Parity with Acceptance under 
Commissioners, The men's Union Reconsideration Vancouver Police protest 
City of Victoria 
Sept. 16, 1970 Lafarge Concrète Ltd. 
Métro Cernent Ltd. 
Océan Cernent Ltd. 
Teamsters' Private Directed Binding Wage increase Médiation Com. 
mission suggested 
reconsideration 
Sept. 23, 1970 Alberni Pulp and 
Paper Ltd. 
IBEW Private Procedured 4 Binding Extra benefits Ordered back to 
work 
Oct. 30, 1970 Lafarge Concrète Ltd. 
Métro Cément Ltd. 
Teamsters' Private Directed 
Reconsideration 
Binding Wage increase Acceptance under 
protest 
Jan. 15, 1971 B. C. Hydro and 
Power Authority 
The Amalgamated 
Transit Union 
Public Procédural Non-binding Wage increase No (Strike) 
March 29, 1971 Automotive Transport 
Labour Relations Assoc. 
Teamsters' Private Directed Binding Struck good 
clause 
Yes 
1 The date on which the Décision was rendered by the Commission. 
2 Directed means the hearing was directed by the Minister of Labour under Section 14 or 39. 
3 Voluntary means either party had made a request for a hearing, and the other party had agreed to the hearing. 
4
 Procédural means the parties appear before the Commission as a procédural matter after the appointaient of the médiation 
officer. The Médiation Commission can order a hearing without a formai request from either party. 
756 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 26, NO 3 
In 1969, there were 85 work stoppages in the province, and four of 
the Commission's original décisions were rendered in the same year. This 
gave the Commission a record of complète involvement in 5.7% of the 
disputes involving work stoppages. However, three of the four décisions 
were rendered on disputes which did not resuit in a work stoppage, and 
the one décision which involved work stoppage was not binding on the 
parties, therefore the effect of the décisions by the Commission in the 
réduction of work stoppage was close to nil. The disputes which did not 
involve a work stoppage were disputes between the municipalities and the 
police and firemen, which would hâve been arbitrated under the coverage 
of the Municipal Act had the Médiation Commission not been introduced. 
In 1970, only two non-reconsidered décisions were rendered by the 
Commission. The total number of work stoppages was greater than in 
1969. Therefore, the showing of the Médiation Commission was even less 
impressive than the year before. Both décisions were made on disputes in 
the private sector. One dicision was binding due to an order of the go-
vernment as well as to prior agreement between the cernent industry and 
the Teamsters. The other décision was ordered to be binding on 55 electric 
workers of the IBEW by the Minister of Labour. The number of man-days 
which was probably saved as a resuit of thèse décisions was relatively 
small compared to the total number of man-days lost during the entire 
year. 
In 1971, two décisions were rendered. The décision on the dispute 
between the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority and The Amalgamated 
Transit Union was not binding on the parties. It was rejected by the union, 
which never attended the hearing, and a strike resulted. With the excep-
tion of some older people, the strike had relatively little effect on the 
gênerai public. The décision on the dispute between the Teamsters and 
the Automotive Transport Labour Relations Association was binding and 
was accepted by both parties. Since approximately 75% of the industry 
was affected by the seven-day strike and lockout, a lengthy strike could 
hâve caused substantial damage to the B.C. economy. One is inclined to 
crédit the use of section 18, in this instance, as an effective protection of 
public interest. 
Finally, a word should be said about the hearing on a dispute involv-
ing psychiatrie nurses in 1968 which was held before the Médiation Com-
mission Act was proclaimed. The décision was accepted by both parties. 
IMPORTANT RÉCENT DISPUTES 
It would be misleading to think that the entire history of the Média-
tion Commission Act can be summarized in the number of décisions made 
by the Commission. The important labour disputes which were dealt with 
outside of the commissions are at least as important to our évaluation of 
the effectiveness of the Commission as the décisions themselves. Some of 
the events should shed light on the effectiveness of the Médiation Com-
mission. 
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After five hearings by the Médiation Commission, and after a year 
had elapsed since the Act was passed in the Législature, the controversial 
Section 18 of the Médiation Commission still had not been tested. When 
the operating engineers struck the Vancouver schools, resulting in cancel-
lation of classes for 70,000 students, it was expected that the government 
would intervene in the form of compulsory arbitration. A médiation officer 
had been appointed in December of the previous year to assist the parties 
to reach a settlement. Following the report of a médiation officer, and 
subséquent action on January 23, the Médiation Commission held a pre-
liminary inquiry, which led to a hearing on January 28, 1970. The hearing 
was not ordered under Section 18 of the Act. The operating engineers, 
however, refused to appear before the Commission. Under the Médiation 
Commission Act, the Commission has the power to compel the attendance 
of witnesses, but this power was not used. The union and the Vancouver 
School Board had agreed in private to submit their dispute to a private 
independent arbitrator, and there was to be no work stoppage when the 
arbitration was in progress. As a resuit of this agreement, the hearing 
ended. This marked the first time that a party attempted, and succeeded, 
to avoid the hearing of the Médiation Commission. 
Other long and bitter disputes which would hâve provided idéal 
testing grounds for the Médiation Commission, took place in 1970. How-
ever, several were beyond the jurisdiction of the Médiation Commission. 
One such dispute was the long-drawn-out dispute between the West Coast 
Long-shoremen and the Maritime Employers' Association. It lasted from 
September 25, 1969 to November 8, 1969. The strike ended when a trace 
was called. The strike resumed on February 5, 1970 until February 12, 
1970. As a resuit of the first strike 101,510 man-days were lost ; 19,380 
man-days were lost in the second strike. The total number of workers 
involved in the dispute was 3,230 20. 
The longshore industry is covered by the Industrial Labour Relations 
and Disputes Investigation Act, which is fédéral législation. The secondary 
effect of the longshore dispute on the economy of British Columbia was 
substantial. It affected the export of primary products such as lumber, 
pulp and paper, minerai ores, which are the major export products of the 
province. There was nothing that the Médiation Commission could do to 
résolve the longshore dispute. An unfair burden is put on the Médiation 
Commission when gross statistics are cited to measure its effectiveness. 
Another important dispute was that between the Printers' Union and 
the Pacific Press, which publishes two of the largest newspaper in the 
province, the Sun and the Province. A lockout resulted when Pacific Press 
accused employées of practising slowdowns. The lockout began on Fe-
bruary 16, and ended on May 10, 1970. It involved only 1,200 employées, 
the union started publishing a newspaper named the Vancouver Express 
during the lockout. The public was not unduly inconvenienced. However, 
the négative publicity generated due to the absence of regular newspapers 
20 The Labour Gazette, February and May, 1970, p. 175 and p. 390. 
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ave the people of the province a feeling of frustration which probably 
eightened their expectation of what the Médiation Commission should 
accomplish. 
THE CONSTRUCTION DISPUTE 
The largest work stoppage of the year took place in the construction 
industry. Nine unions were locked out by the Construction Labour Re-
lations Association of British Columbia from April 14, 1970. It was 
estimated that 80% of construction work in British Columbia areas 
halted21. The dispute was expected to be long-drawn-out as a resuit of 
the certification of the Construction Labour Relations Association as a 
bargaining agent for the majority of the large construction firms in the 
province. In the month of July, the government of the province decided 
that it could no longer tolerate the protracted work stoppage. The Minister 
of Labour requested the employers to lift the lockout and the union mem-
bers to return to work. CLRA complied with the request, but the unions 
refused to take heed of the request. A back-to-work order was issued on 
July 18, 1970 under Sections 18 and 21 of the Médiation Commission 
Act. Under Section 21, workers must return to work within 24 hours 
after the order is issued. Ail the unions which did not reach agreement 
with the CLRA, except the Teamsters, defied the order of the govern-
ment. The Médiation Commission began preliminary hearings. AU the 
unions affiliated with the BCFL boycotted the hearings ; only the Team-
sters showed up22. The Premier of the province intervened personally 
and ordered the men back to work. A compromise was reached, in that 
the Deputy Minister of Labour was named as mediator, and the unions 
recommended to their members that they return to work no later than 
July 27, 1970. The proceedings before the Médiation Commission were 
postponed indefinitely 23. Neither the unions nor the union members were 
prosecuted by the government for violation of the back-to-work order. 
The work stoppage lasted over three months. The Médiation Commission 
was successfully by-passed by labour with the coopération of the govern-
ment. This marked the second time that a major dispute was mediated 
outside the Médiation Commission 24. 
OTHER DISPUTES NOT MEDIATED BY THE COMMISSION 
At the time of the construction work stoppage, another major event 
of conséquence took place. The International Woodworkers of America, 
21 Industrial Relations Bulletin, Employers' Council of B. C. May 15, 1970, p. 2. 
2 2
 BCFL stands for the British Columbia Fédération of Labour. 
23
 Employers' Council of B. C , Industrial Relations Bulletin, Vol, 2, No. 29, 
July 24, 1970, p. 5. Deputy Minister of Labour, Bill Sands, was named mediator 
after the parties could not agrée on an independent mediator. 
2 4
 The first major dispute which by-passed the Commission was the ap>poitment 
of Mr. Nemetz to médiate the forestry dispute as explained in the succeeding para-
graph. 
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the Forest Industrial Relations Limited, and the Minister of Labour had 
agreed to the appointment of Mr. Justice Nathan Nemetz of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal to assist the parties in their dispute on July 6, 
1970. The parties had agreed not to conduct any lockout or strike during 
the judge's study of the dispute. The appointment of the judge was made 
under Section 34 of the Médiation Commission Act which provides that 
« experts and persons having spécial or technical knowledge » can be 
called upon to help the Commission carry out its duties. Despite the fact 
that Section 34 was not intended to shunt the médiation process to an 
outsider, it was invoked in order to avoid a showdown between the go-
vernment and organized labour. This was the first time that a major 
dispute, which involved 28,000 workers, was mediated by a person out-
side the Médiation Commission. Thèse two events had greatly undermined 
the status and importance of the Médiation Commission. 
In between the periods of thèse two concessions made by the govern-
ment to organized labour, the well-publicized towboat strike took place : 
between May 3 and June 15, 1970. By May 20, 14,000 of the employées 
in the forest industry were laid off as a resuit of illégal secondary boycotts 
by the towboat employées. Nearly 5,000 of the 10,000 employées of the 
pulp and paper industry were also laid off because of illégal picketing. 
On May 15, the Merchant Service Guild had to answer 28 writs and 11 
anti-picketing injunctions since the strike began25. Again, the Médiation 
Commission did not hâve jurisdiction over the dispute, as in the case of 
the longshore strike. The towboat dispute was covered under fédéral 
jurisdiction. However, the long and bitter dispute could not help but give 
the Médiation Commission an unfavourable image in the eyes of the 
gênerai public, which was unaware of the fine distinction between pro-
vincial jurisdiction and fédéral jurisdiction 26. 
THE COMMISSIONS EFFECTIVENESS 
In light of the foregoing analysis, one can see that the actual impact 
of the Médiation Commission on the economy of British Columbia was 
small. In the disputes which did or could seriously affect the economy of 
British Columbia, such as the construction industry dispute and the IWA 
dispute, the Commission was by-passed by the government in its attempt 
to pacify organized labour. 
The only décision which appears to hâve benefited the B.C. economy 
was that in the dispute between the Teamsters and the Automative Trans-
port Labour Relations Association which took place in February of 1971. 
However, the legality of the « struck good » issue was evidently in ques-
tion. It was doubtful whether the strike would hâve caused substantial 
25 Employers' Council of B. C , A case study of a labour dispute in the B. C. 
towboat industry, 1969-1970, November 1970, p. 14. 
26
 Those industries which engage in interprovincial commerce such as transpor-
tation, communication, banking and other financier institutions are within fédéral 
jurisdiction. 
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damage to the economy over any issue of which the immédiate benefit to 
the members was not apparent27. The causes for a lengthy strike were 
conspicuously absent. It would be a short strike without government in-
tervention. 
In other disputes which seriously affected the B.C. economy, such 
as the longshore dispute and the towboat dispute, the Commission did 
not hâve jurisdiction. However, the Commission had served a function, 
which was ignored by the press, in protecting employées and employers 
who were not parties to the dispute from encroachment on their rights by 
the disputing parties. 
The Médiation Commission is not necessarily powerless and defunct. 
Reading the décisions of the Commission, one cannot help but be im-
pressed by the fact that the Commission has performed a function which 
has not been given the attention it deserves. Its purpose is not only to 
hand down a décision which the parties agrée to, but also to protect the 
employées and employers, who are not parties to the dispute ; freedom 
from encroachment on their rights is protected by the laws of the land 28. 
The Médiation Commission also has contributed substantially to much 
needed research on the nature and characteristics of collective agreements 
in British Columbia. It has collected over 3 thousand collective agree-
ments and has placed contract information on the computer, thus provid-
ing the most comprehensive analysis of collective agreements in North 
America. However, the Commission has not succeeded in changing the 
attitudes of any parties in the labour-management-government relation-
ship. Perhaps due to the lack of sensitivity to the feelings of the labour 
movement in gênerai, the Commission appears to hâve actually aggravated 
the already poor relationship between the labour movement and the go-
vernment. The remark made by the Chairman of the Médiation Commis-
sion that public employées should not hâve the right to strike led many to 
question his qualification to act as an impartial Chairman of a neutral 
body29. The luxurious office of the Commission has also unnecessarily 
aroused the négative feelings of labour. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Without a doubt, the Médiation Commission has so far failed to alter 
the trend of increasingly lengthy and bitter labour disputes in the province. 
Some blâme the controversial Section 18 of the Médiation Commission 
27 The Teamsters wanted the right to refuse to handle trucks which are driven 
across the picket line by non-union personnel. Also cf. Médiation Commission Déci-
sion, March 29, 1971, pp. 4-9. 
28 Décisions of the Médiation Commission, 1968-1971, Trade Union Act of 
British Columbia, Sec. 3 ; Canadian Labour Laws Cases, Vol. 4, 1967-1969, CCH 
Canadian Limited, paragraphs 14, 216 ; 14, 142 and etc. 
29 Public employées in the fédéral government in Canada hâve the right to 
strike. Also see the Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967. 
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Act as the major obstacle to the operational effectiveness of the Médiation 
Commission. Some hâve suggested that the failure of the Commission was 
mainly the fault of the présent chairman and that a better qualified, more 
highly respected chairman would hâve done a better job. Obviously, with-
out Section 18, the Médiation Commission would not hâve commanded 
such attention or criticism. It would be no différent from hundreds of 
other such médiation and conciliation bodies. To suggest that labour would 
be more coopérative if a more acceptable chairman of the Commission 
were appointed is to ignore the political reality of the province. It is 
quite unlikely that the différences between government and labour could 
be patched up by changing the chairman of the Médiation Commission. 
What is likely to happen now ? Bill 33 is not working. To remove 
Section 18 is to castrate the Bill. To change the chairman of the Commis-
sion is not likely to lead to any better results. What can be done to improve 
the industrial relations System in the province ? 
It seems clear that compulsion has never been successful in reducing 
the number of industrial disputes. Australia has « no-work-stoppage » 
législation since 1904, yet, in the last ten years, she has had more work 
stoppages than Canada with a smaller population30. During the Second 
législation since 1904, yet, in the last ten years, she has had more work 
World War, the United States had about the same average number of 
work stoppages as either before or after the War. Without a doubt, the 
spirit of coopération between labour and management was higher during 
the War than during any other time-period. Work stoppages were made 
illégal in the war industries, yet they took place. Many of the current wave 
of strikes such as the postal strike, the railway strikes, teachers' strikes 
and nurses' strikes in the United States are illégal under either fédéral 
or state labour législation, yet they occur. Time and again, the govern-
ment has had to refrain from prosecution of workers who hâve openly 
flaunted government orders, for sheer lack of resources to make such 
prosecutions. One is forced to conclude that labour cannot be forced to 
work when it décides to contest the power of the government. 
Obviously, repeal of Section 18 of Bill 33, or a return of the power 
of ordering compulsory arbitration to législature, will please labour31. If 
the government were willing to make such a concession, it might persuade 
labour to be more coopérative, thus perhaps reducing the tension in indus-
trial disputes. This would enable the Médiation Commission to function 
in a less emotional atmosphère. The Commission would then be no dif-
férent from many other such bodies, but it could at least provide urgently 
needed research and impartial opinions, which are necessary for a rational 
approach to labour disputes. This is not a solution to the problem, but 
it might provide a step in the right direction. 
30 Herbert R. NORTHRUP, op. cit., supra note 9, p. 393 and Employers' Council 
of B. C , International Comparisons in Strikes and Lockouts, August 1970, p. 3. 
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This study concludes that the Médiation Commission has been given 
an essentially impossible task ; that Section 18 of Bill 33 should be 
repealed ; and that the power to order binding arbitration should be re-
turned to the législature. 
L'arbitrage obligatoire en Colombie Britannique : le Bill 33 
La loi sur l'arbitrage obligatoire en Colombie Britannique date de 1968. On a 
dit de cette législation qu'elle était la première du genre en Amérique du Nord 
s'appliquant au secteur privé. Cette législation portait deux noms : le Bill 33 et le 
Médiation Commission Act. Cette loi confie à une commission de médiation le soin 
d'enquêter lors des conflits du travail. La Commission, tant dans ses actes que dans 
ses réunions, se conduit comme un Tribunal, mais elle a la qualité d'être plus flexi-
ble qu'un Tribunal du travail dans l'audition des témoignages, dans l'assignation des 
témoins et dans la procédure. L'article 18 de cette loi donne au Cabinet le pouvoir 
d'imposer un règlement aux parties pour une période de deux ans lorsque l'intérêt 
public le demande, à la suite d'une décision de la Commission de médiation. N'im-
porte laquelle des deux parties impliquées dans le conflit, ou le Ministre du travail 
lui-même, peuvent exiger la tenue d'une enquête. La décision peut être rendue exé-
cutoire avant la tenue de l'enquête si les deux parties y ont consenti d'avance. 
Mais en fait, cette législation sur l'arbitrage obligatoire n'est pas la première 
du genre en Amérique du Nord. Le Manitoba et un certain nombre d'États améri-
cains ont passé des législations semblables au cours de la première guerre mondiale. 
Cependant c'est la première fois au Canada que l'arbitrage obligatoire, tel que défini 
dans la loi, est appliqué aux industries du secteur privé autres que les utilités publi-
ques en temps de paix. 
C'est pendant une période où le public était de plus en plus mécontent de la 
montée grandissante de longues grèves qu'on a décidé de présenter cette loi. En 
1966, l'incidence des grèves au Canada était beaucoup plus forte qu'aux États-Unis 
comme l'indiquent les mesures principales, c'est-à-dire le pourcentage des journées 
de travail perdues, le pourcentage de syndiqués impliqués, la fréquence relative et 
la durée moyenne. En 1968, le Canada arrivait bon premier parmi les pays occiden-
taux pour le nombre de jours-hommes perdus par mille personnes employées ; d'où 
la réaction que les syndicats étaient trop forts en Colombie Britannique. En 1969, 
40.9% des salariés de cette province étaient syndiqués. C'est le plus haut pourcen-
tage au pays. La province tenait le première place au chapitre du niveau général des 
salaires. Même si le nombre de grèves et le nombre de travailleurs impliqués dans 
ces grèves étaient plus petit en Colombie Britanunique que dans le pays en général, 
lorsque l'on base la distribution sur la population, cette province a connu des durées 
31
 Recently the back to work order was issued to the Teamsters in their dispute 
with the ATLRA only after the debate in the législature. ATLRA was aliso ordered 
to lift the lockout. 
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de grèves 70% plus élevées que la moyenne nationale pour la dernière décade. Pre-
nant en considération la tendance pro-patronale de la législature, la loi sur la Com-
mission de médiation était inévitable. 
Cependant, cette législation n'a pas réussi à réduire ni la fréquence ni la durée 
des grèves. Cette faillite peut en partie être attribuée au manque de bonne volonté 
de la part du gouvernement qui se traduit par son absence de recours à l'article 18 
de la loi. Une autre explication réside dans la séparation des pouvoirs en matière de 
conflits du travail entre les gouvernements provincial et fédéral ainsi qu'à l'insuccès 
de la part de la Commission à inspirer confiance aux chefs du mouvement syndical. 
Souventes fois, le gouvernement a permis l'intervention de médiateurs ou d'arbitres 
privés au lieu de référer les conflits importants à la Commission de médiation. Ceci 
n'a fait que nuire au statut de cette Commission. Cette dernière n'a jamais pu se 
relever de la perte de prestige qu'elle a subie lorsqu'elle fut mise de côté à l'occasion 
du règlement du conflit dans l'industrie de la forêt, l'industrie la plus importante 
de la Colombie Britannique. Alors le gouvernement n'as pas supporté l'ordre donné 
aux travailleurs de la construction de retourner au travail, ordre donné sous l'article 
de la loi. Très peu de gens sont convaincus que le gouvernement est prêt à faire face 
au mouvement syndical lorsque ce mouvement est uni dans ses décisions et est prêt 
à défier le gouvernement. Les longs et sévères conflits qui suivirent dans les indus-
tries du débardage et des remorqueurs relevaient de la juridiction fédérale. Il en 
résultat que la loi de la Commission de la médiation était sans aucun pouvoir. Fina-
lement, le président de la Commission a été constamment attaqué par le mouvement 
syndical : ceci a créé des difficultés supplémentaires lorsque le gouvernement a 
décidé de se servir de l'article 18. Tous ces facteurs ont contribué à rendre la loi 
sur la Commission de médiation relativement inefficace. 
Pendant une durée de 28 mois, la Commission n'a rendu que 11 décisions dont 
2 révisions. Quatre des neuf décisions concernaient des conflits dans le secteur privé. 
Parmi celles-ci, deux ont été rendues exécutoires par le Cabinet provincial. Parmi 
les deux autres, une n'était pas exécutoire alors que l'autre l'était suite à l'accord 
mutuel des parties impliquées. Parmi les cinq décisions touchant des conflits dans 
le secteur public, le syndicat en accepta quatre et en refusa une. Ces conflits affec-
tèrent moins de 5% des conflits du travail en Colombie Britannique et même moins 
en termes de nombre de travailleurs concernés. Leur effet sur l'économie provinciale 
était négligeable. La réalisation majeure de cette loi a été de fournir des opinions 
légales sérieuses concernant les conflits, opinions qui furent souvent ignorées, et de 
compléter des recherches originales par ordinatur sur les caractéristiques des con-
ventions collectives dans cette province. 
Sans aucun doute, la loi sur la Commission de médiation en Colombie Britan-
nique n'a pas réussi à faire éviter les longs et pénibles conflits industriels. Considé-
rant le climat des relations du travail dans cette province à l'heure actuelle, il est 
très improbable de prévoir une utilisation plus efficace de l'article 18 dans le futur. 
Ce dont on a d'abord besoin dans cette province, c'est d'un esprit de coopération 
entre les syndicats, la direction et le gouvernement. La révocation de l'article 18 de 
cette loi pourrait entraîner la création d'un tel esprit. Le climat de cette province 
nous amène à conclure qu'il ne serait pas surprenant de voir cet article 18 abrogé 
dans un avenir très proche. 
